You are here:

The impact of high-stakes testing on student proficiency in low-stakes subjects: Evidence from Florida's elementary science exam
ARTICLE

, ,

Economics of Education Review Volume 29, Number 1, ISSN 0272-7757 Publisher: Elsevier Ltd

Abstract

An important criticism of high-stakes testing policies – policies that reward or sanction schools based on their students’ performance on standardized tests – is that they provide schools with an incentive to focus on those subjects that play a role in the accountability system while decreasing attention to those subjects that are not part of the program. This paper utilizes a regression discontinuity design to evaluate the impact of Florida's high-stakes testing policy on student proficiency in the low-stakes subject of science. We confirm prior results that students in schools facing more immediate sanctions under the policy made substantial gains in the high-stakes subjects of math and reading. Contrary to the crowding-out hypothesis, we find that students in these schools made substantial achievement gains in the low-stakes subject of science as well.

Citation

Winters, M.A., Trivitt, J.R. & Greene, J.P. (2010). The impact of high-stakes testing on student proficiency in low-stakes subjects: Evidence from Florida's elementary science exam. Economics of Education Review, 29(1), 138-146. Elsevier Ltd. Retrieved December 6, 2023 from .

This record was imported from Economics of Education Review on March 1, 2019. Economics of Education Review is a publication of Elsevier.

Full text is availabe on Science Direct: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.econedurev.2009.07.004

Keywords

References

View References & Citations Map
  1. Bacolod, M., & Tobias, J.L. (2006). Schools, school quality and achievement growth: Evidence from the Philippines . Economics of Education Review, 25(6), pp. 619-632.
  2. Carnoy, M. (2001). Do school vouchers improve student performance? . American Prospect, 12(1), pp. 42-45.
  3. Chakrabarti, R. (2005). Do public schools facing voucher behave strategically? Evidence from Florida. Manuscript. Program on Education Policy and Governance.
  4. Figlio, D.N. (2006). Testing, crime and punishment . Journal of Public Economics, 90(4–5), pp. 837-851.
  5. Figlio, D. N., & Getzler L. S. (2002). Accountability, ability, and disability: Gaming the system. NBER Working Paper #9307.
  6. Figlio, D.N., & Rouse, C. (2005). Do accountability and voucher threats improve low-performing schools? . Journal of Public Economics, 90, pp. 239-255.
  7. Gordon, J. (). From broadway to the ABCs: Making meaning of arts reform in the age of accountability . Educational Foundations, 16(2), pp. 33-53.
  8. Greene, J. P. (2001). An evaluation of the Florida A-plus accountability and school choice program. Manuscript, Manhattan Institute.
  9. Greene, J.P., & Winters, M.A. (2004). Competition passes the test . Education Next, 4(3), pp. 66-71.
  10. Groves, P. (). ’Doesn’t it feel morbid here?’ high-stakes testing and the widening of the equity gap . Educational Foundations, 16(2), pp. 15-31.
  11. Gunzenhauser, M.G. (). High-stakes testing and the default philosophy of education . Theory into Practice, 42(1), pp. 51-58.
  12. Harris, D. (2001). What caused the effects of the Florida A+ program: Ratings or vouchers? . School vouchers: Examining the evidence.
  13. Holmstrom, B., & Milgrom, P. (1991). Multitask principal-agent analyses: Incentive contracts, asset ownership, and job design . Journal of Law Economics, and Organization, 7(special issue), pp. 24-52.
  14. Jacob, B.A. (2005). Accountability, incentives and behavior: The impact of high-stakes testing in the chicago public schools . Journal of Public Economics, 89(5–6), pp. 761-796.
  15. Jones, M.G., Jones, B.D., Hardin, B., & Chapman, L. (1999). The impact of high-stakes testing on teachers and students in North Carolina . Phi Delta Kappan, 81(3), p. 199.
  16. King, R.A., & Mathers, J.K. (). Improving schools through performance-based accountability and financial rewards . Journal of Education Finance, 23(2), pp. 147-176.
  17. Ladd, H.F. (2001). School-based educational accountability systems: The promise and the pitfalls . National Tax Journal, 54(2), pp. 385-400.
  18. McNeil, L.M. (2000). Creating new inequalities: Contradictions of reform . Phi Delta Kappan, 81(10), pp. 728-734.
  19. Murillo, E.G., & Flores, S.Y. (2002). Reform by shame: Managing the stigma of labels in high stakes testing . Educational Foundations, 16(2), pp. 93-108.
  20. New York State Education Department (2004). The impact of high-stakes exams on students and teachers. NYSED Policy Brief.
  21. Nichols, S.L., & Berliner, D.C. (2007). Collateral damage: How high-stakes testing corrupts America's schools . Cambridge, MA: Harvard Education Press.
  22. Patterson, J.A. (). Exploring reform as symbolism and expression of belief . Educational Foundations, 16(2), pp. 55-75.
  23. Reback, R. (2008). Teaching to the rating: School accountability and the distribution of school achievement . Journal of Public Economics, 92, pp. 1394-1415.
  24. Rouse, C. E., Hannaway, J., Goldhaber, D., & Figlio, D. (2007). Feeling the Florida heat? How low-performing schools respond to voucher and accountability pressure, National Center for Analysis of Longitudinal Data in Education Research, Working Paper 13.
  25. Springer, M.G. (2008). The influence of an NCLB accountability plan on the distribution of student test score gains . Economics of Education Review, 27(5), pp. 556-563.
  26. West, M.R., & Peterson, P.E. (2006). The efficacy of choice threats within school accountability systems: Results from legislatively induced experiments . Economic Journal, 116(510), pp. C46-62.

These references have been extracted automatically and may have some errors. Signed in users can suggest corrections to these mistakes.

Suggest Corrections to References