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The influence of an NCLB accountability plan on the distribution of student test score gains
ARTICLE

Economics of Education Review Volume 27, Number 5 ISSN 0272-7757 Publisher: Elsevier Ltd

Abstract

Previous research on the effect of accountability programs on the distribution of student test score gains is decidedly mixed. This study examines the issue by estimating an educational production function in which test score gains are a function of the incentives schools have to focus instruction on below-proficient students. NCLB's threat of sanctions are positively correlated with test score gains by below-proficient students in failing schools; greater than expected test score gains by below-proficient students do not occur at the expense of high-performing students in failing schools. This pattern of results tends to suggest that failing schools were able to benefit low-performing students in ways that were consistent with having operational slack, and that the threat of sanctions may stimulate greater productivity within failing schools.

Citation

Springer, M.G. The influence of an NCLB accountability plan on the distribution of student test score gains. Economics of Education Review, 27(5), 556-563. Elsevier Ltd. Retrieved November 26, 2020 from .

This record was imported from Economics of Education Review on January 28, 2019. Economics of Education Review is a publication of Elsevier.

Full text is availabe on Science Direct: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.econedurev.2007.06.004

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