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The variation in teachers' grading practices: causes and consequences
ARTICLE

Economics of Education Review Volume 18, Number 1 ISSN 0272-7757 Publisher: Elsevier Ltd

Abstract

The teachers' grading practices vary a lot between the upper secondary schools in Norway. This paper discusses the causes and the consequences. The point of departure is the model laid out by , which incorporates grades as a policy instrument for the teacher who tries to manipulate the students' studying time. However, in the Norwegian institutional setting students have incentives to press for easy grading. We therefore introduce an alternative grading model with rent seeking students, that is, students who allocate time to affect the teachers' grading. We then provide empirical evidence that the teachers' grading is systematically associated with teacher characteristics, and discuss whether this is consistent with the Correa and Gruver's model, the alternative model or both. Thereafter the consequences of teachers' grading for student achievement is investigated empirically. Our tentative interpretation of the results is that hard grading improves student achievement. ["JEL" I21].

Citation

Bonesrønning, H. The variation in teachers' grading practices: causes and consequences. Economics of Education Review, 18(1), 89-106. Elsevier Ltd. Retrieved March 26, 2023 from .

This record was imported from Economics of Education Review on March 1, 2019. Economics of Education Review is a publication of Elsevier.

Full text is availabe on Science Direct: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S0272-7757(98)00012-0

References

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