Graduate education and employee performance: evidence from military personnel
ARTICLE
William R Bowman, Stephen L Mehay
Economics of Education Review Volume 18, Number 4 ISSN 0272-7757 Publisher: Elsevier Ltd
Abstract
Few studies have examined the relationship between on-the-job productivity and graduate education using single-firm data. This paper studies the effect of graduate education on job performance using a unique micro-database consisting of military officers. Supervisor ratings and promotion probabilities are examined for professional and technical officers in the US Navy, a hierarchical organization with an internal labor market and up-or-out promotion policies. Single-stage estimates indicate that, among those eligible to be considered for promotion to grade 4, the up-or-out point, those with any graduate degree are more likely to be promoted. The effect is especially pronounced for those who receive a degree via the Navy's sponsored, full-time program. However, when instruments that are uncorrelated with promotion are used to predict graduate degree status, the results suggest that a sizeable portion of the relationship between graduate education and promotion is due to unobserved attributes that lead some people to attend (or to be selected for) graduate school and to be more promotable. The selection-corrected estimates of the promotion effect of graduate education are reduced by between 40 and 50%. [JEL I21, J24]
Citation
Bowman, W.R. & Mehay, S.L. Graduate education and employee performance: evidence from military personnel. Economics of Education Review, 18(4), 453-463. Elsevier Ltd. Retrieved March 28, 2024 from https://www.learntechlib.org/p/205614/.
This record was imported from Economics of Education Review on March 1, 2019. Economics of Education Review is a publication of Elsevier.
Full text is availabe on Science Direct: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S0272-7757(99)00014-XKeywords
References
View References & Citations Map- Asch, B. J., & Warner, J. T. (1994). A theory of compensation and personnel policy. Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corporation.
- Baker, G., Gibbs, M., & Holmstrom, B. (1994a). The internal economics of the firm: evidence from personnel data. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 109(4), 881–920.
- Baker, G., Gibbs, M., & Holmstrom, B. (1994b). The wage policy of a firm. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 109(4), 921–956.
- Bartel, A.P (1995). Training, wage growth, and job performance: evidence from a company database . Journal of Labor Economics, 13(3), pp. 401-425.
- Bishop, J. (1987). The recognition and reward of employee performance . Journal of Labor Economics, 5(4), pp. S36-S56.
- Cohn, E., & Hughes, W.W (1994). A benefit–cost analysis of investment in college education in the U.S.: 1969–1985 . Economics of Education Review, 13(2), pp. 109-123.
- Dunson, B. (1985). Pay, experience, and productivity: the government sector case . Journal of Human Resources, 20(1), pp. 153-160.
- Gerhart, B. A., & Milkovich, G. T. (1989). Salaries, salary growth, and promotions of men and women in a large, private firm. In R. T. Michael, H. I. Hartmann, & B. O'Farrell, Pay equity: empirical inquiries. Washington, DC: National Academy Press.
- Grogger, J., & Eide, E. (1995). Changes in college skills and the rise in the college wage premium . Journal of Human Resources, 30(2), pp. 280-310.
- Hellerstein, J.K, & Neumark, D. (1995). Are earnings profiles steeper than productivity profiles? . Journal of Human Resources, 30(1), pp. 89-112.
- Hutchens, R.M (1989). Seniority, wages, and productivity: a turbulent decade . Journal of Economic Perspectives, 3(4), pp. 49-64.
- Kotlikoff, L.J, & Gokhale, J. (1992). Estimating a firm's age–productivity profile using the present value of workers' earning . Quarterly Journal of Economics, 107(4), pp. 1215-1242.
- Lazear, E. (1981). Agency, earnings profiles, productivity, and hours restrictions . American Economic Review, 71(4), pp. 606-620.
- Lazear, E., & Rosen, S. (1981). Rank-order tournaments as optimum labor contracts . Journal of Political Economics, 89(51), pp. 841-864.
- Medoff, J.L, & Abraham, K.G (1980). Experience, performance, and earnings . Quarterly Journal of Economy, 95, pp. 703-736.
- Neumann, I., Mattson, J., & Abrahams, N. (1989). Development and evaluation of an officer potential composite. San Diego, CA: Navy Personnel Research and Development Center.
- O'Flaherty, B., & Siow, A. (1995). Up-or-out rules in the market for lawyers . Journal of Labor Economics, 13(4), pp. 709-735.
- O'Neill, J. P. (1986). College financial aid and the employee tuition benefits of the Fortune 1000 companies. Princeton, NJ: Conference University Press,.
- Rand Corporation (1994). Future career management systems for U.S. military officers. Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corporation.
- Rosen, S. (1992). The military as an internal labor market: some allocation, productivity, and incentive problems . Social Science Quarterly, 73(2), pp. 227-237.
- Weiss, A. (1995). Human capital vs. signalling explanations of wages . Journal of Economic Perspectives, 9(4), pp. 133-154.
- Weiss, A., & Landau, H. (1985). On the negative correlation between performance and experience and education. Working Paper 1613. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research.
- Wise, D. A. (1975a). Personal attributes, job performance, and probability of promotion. Econometrica, 43(5–6), 913–931.
- Wise, D. A. (1975b). Academic achievement and job performance. American Economic Review, 65(3), 350–366.
- Woo, J.H (1986). Graduate degrees and job success: managers in one U.S. corporation . Economics of Education Review, 5(3), pp. 227-237.
These references have been extracted automatically and may have some errors. Signed in users can suggest corrections to these mistakes.
Suggest Corrections to References